Blocks Multiples

In cryptography, a block cipher operates on blocks of fixed length, often 64 or 128 bits. more...

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Because messages may be of any length, and because encrypting the same plaintext under the same key always produces the same output (as described in the ECB section below), several modes of operation have been invented which allow block ciphers to provide confidentiality for messages of arbitrary length.

The earliest modes described in the literature (eg, ECB, CBC, OFB and CFB) provide only confidentiality or message integrity, but do not perform both simultaneously. Other modes have since been designed which ensure both confidentiality and message integrity in one pass, such as IAPM, CCM, EAX, GCM, and OCB modes. Tweakable narrow-block encryption (LRW) mode, and wide-block encryption (CMC and EME) modes, designed to securely encrypt sectors of a disk, are described in the article devoted to disk encryption theory.

Initialization vector (IV)

All these modes (except ECB) require an initialization vector, or IV -- a sort of 'dummy block' to kick off the process for the first real block, and also to provide some randomization for the process. There is no need for the IV to be secret, in most cases, but it is important that it is never reused with the same key. For CBC and CFB, reusing an IV leaks some information about the first block of plaintext, and about any common prefix shared by the two messages. For OFB and CTR, reusing an IV completely destroys security. In CBC mode, the IV must, in addition, be randomly generated at encryption time.

Electronic codebook (ECB)

The simplest of the encryption modes is the electronic codebook (ECB) mode. The message is divided into blocks and each block is encrypted separately. The disadvantage of this method is that identical plaintext blocks are encrypted into identical ciphertext blocks; thus, it does not hide data patterns well. In some senses, it doesn't provide serious message confidentiality, and it is not recommended for use in cryptographic protocols at all.

Here's a striking example of the degree to which ECB can leave plaintext data patterns in the ciphertext. A pixel-map version of the image on the left was encrypted with ECB mode to create the center image:

The image on the right is how the image might look encrypted with CBC, CTR or any of the other more secure modes -- indistinguishable from random noise. Note that the random appearance of the image on the right tells us very little about whether the image has been securely encrypted; many kinds of insecure encryption have been developed which would produce output just as 'random-looking'.

Read more at Wikipedia.org